Monopolio e intervención.

Maestre_de_Campo

El último ejemplo (via wp) es el mercado de la leche en EEUU, en el que un cártel se ha unido para expulsar a un competidor. Eso sí, la expulsión no se ha realizado en el mercado, se ha hecho en el congreso:

Hein Hettinga started bottling his own milk and selling it for as much as 20 cents a gallon less than the competition, exercising his right to work outside the rigid system that has controlled U.S. milk production for almost 70 years. Soon the effects were rippling through the state, helping to hold down retail prices at supermarkets and warehouse stores.

That was when a coalition of giant milk companies and dairies, along with their congressional allies, decided to crush Hettinga’s initiative. For three years, the milk lobby spent millions of dollars on lobbying and campaign contributions and made deals with lawmakers, including incoming Senate Majority Leader Harry M. Reid (D-Nev.).

Last March, Congress passed a law reshaping the Western milk market and essentially ending Hettinga’s experiment — all without a single congressional hearing.

En este sentido cabe suponer que la ausencia del Estado no implica ausencia del monopolio, pero sí parece haber una relación positiva entre regulación y monopolio, así como entre regulación y corrupción.